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Hoping for the Best or
Preparing for the Worst?
Regulatory Focus and Preferences for
Optimism and Pessimism in Predicting
Personal Outcomes
Abigail Hazlett and Daniel C. Molden
Northwestern University
Aaron M. Sackett
University of St. Thomas

People are rarely completely accurate in forecasting their own futures. Instead, past research has demonstrated tendencies for both optimistic and
pessimistic bias in thinking about one’s own outcomes. Furthermore, both
biases are thought to be potentially functional. Recently, an “intuitive functionalist” account of forecasting biases has been proposed (Sackett & Armor, 2010; see also Armor, Massey, & Sackett, 2008), which posits that
individuals flexibly shift between optimistic or pessimistic outlooks based
on the perceived value of each outlook. The present research examines
people’s chronic motivational orientations as one factor that influences
perceptions of the functional value of optimistic or pessimistic outlooks.
Across three studies, we demonstrate that those primarily concerned with
growth and advancement (i.e., promotion) prefer optimistic forecasts and
perform better when adopting an optimistic outlook, whereas those primarily concerned with safety and security (i.e., prevention) prefer pessimistic
forecasts and perform better when adopting a pessimistic outlook.

Understanding how people anticipate the consequences of their behaviors is of
great importance for understanding what behaviors they choose. Individuals who
make different predictions concerning the actions they take are also likely to make
different decisions about which goals to pursue, what strategies to use in working
toward these goals, and whether to persist in the face of obstacles.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Abigail Hazlett, Northwestern
University, Psychology Department, 2029 N. Sheridan Rd., Swift Hall, Room 102, Evanston, IL 60208.
E-mail: a-hazlett@u.northwestern.edu.
© Guilford Publications, Inc. 2011
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When predicting their own future, people may err in the direction of optimism
(“I’ll shed these extra pounds quickly”) or they may err in the direction of pessimism (“I’m never going to lose these last 5 pounds”). Previous literature has
focused primarily on determining which of these errors is most common (e.g.,
Scheier & Carver, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1980) or most beneficial
(e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994; Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Scheier & Carver, 1993; Taylor & Armor, 1996). The present research, however, builds on more recent efforts
to determine when individuals might desire to be optimistic or pessimistic (Armor,
Massey, & Sackett, 2008; Sackett & Armor, 2010) to investigate whether people’s
basic motivational concerns influence why individuals gravitate toward one outlook or the other. Specifically, the present research proposes that one function of an
optimistic outlook is to support a motivational orientation toward advancement
(i.e., promotion) and that this outlook is therefore preferred by promotion-focused
individuals, whereas one function of a pessimistic outlook is to support a motivational orientation toward security (i.e., prevention) and that this outlook is therefore
preferred by prevention-focused individuals.

The Prevalence and Consequences of
Optimistic and Pessimistic Biases
Optimism about future outcomes is one of several well-established self-serving
biases (see Taylor & Brown, 1988), at least among people with Western European
cultural backgrounds (see Heine & Lehman, 1995; cf. Rose, Endo, Windschitl, &
Suls, 2008). Weinstein (1980) found that participants in his studies were optimistic about their chances of achieving positive outcomes (e.g., landing a good job)
and avoiding negative outcomes (e.g., getting divorced) across a wide variety of
important life domains including work, relationships, and health (see also Dunning & Story, 1991). Moreover, some researchers have proposed that, in addition
to being prevalent, these types of optimistic biases are functional and adaptive because they sustain coping and well-being in times of stress (Taylor & Armor, 1996;
Taylor & Brown, 1988). Indeed, Scheier and Carver (1993) have even argued that
optimism has not only psychological but also physical benefits, and have shown
that dispositional optimists had better health outcomes in the days and months
following open heart surgery than did pessimists (Scheier et al., 1989). Although
others have argued that optimism can also have drawbacks for mental and physical health (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994; Weinstein, Marcus, & Moser, 2005), the prevailing view seems to be that optimism often serves a positive, functional purpose
for well-being (see Taylor & Armor, 1996).
Complementing these studies on optimism, additional research has demonstrated the functionality of pessimism as well; Norem and Cantor (1986) have observed
that although optimism may be a common bias, (a) many individuals are dispositionally pessimistic, and (b) these individuals may use pessimism as a buffer
against potentially debilitating performance anxiety. In studies supporting these
observations, not only were a distinct group of defensive pessimists identified, but,
for these individuals, taking a pessimistic viewpoint was found to improve their
performance (Norem & Illingworth, 1993). Furthermore, a series of studies on prefactual thinking (i.e., considerations of what may happen) by Sanna (1996) showed
that defensive pessimists performed better when asked to think of upward pref-
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actuals (e.g., “If only I was more prepared for this task”) rather than downward
prefactuals (e.g., “There are a number of people who will do worse than me on this
task”), while the reverse pattern was observed for optimists.
Thus, overall, both systematic optimism and systematic pessimism have been
found with some prevalence, and each of these biases has been associated with
certain benefits. Whereas optimism may buffer stress and contribute to positive
coping and persistence (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1993; Taylor & Armor, 1996), pessimism may buffer anxiety and aid in the management of expectations (e.g., Norem
& Illingworth, 1993; Sanna, 1996).

Understanding Preferences for Optimistic
or Pessimistic Forecasts
Given that optimism and pessimism may serve different functions, it is possible
that individuals could selectively favor optimism or pessimism depending on
their perceptions of the usefulness or appropriateness of either of these outlooks
for a given situation. Indeed, Sackett and Armor (2010) have recently proposed an
“intuitive functionalist” account of forecasting biases that attempts to explain how
this selection occurs (see also Armor et al., 2008). Although people may value accuracy as an ideal, they also recognize the difficulty of achieving complete accuracy
in predicting the future; therefore, they may implicitly or explicitly choose to err
on the side of optimism or pessimism (i.e., display a forecasting preference) based on
what they believe to be the immediate consequences of either of these biases.
For example, in a study by Shepperd, Ouellette, and Fernandez (1996), college
students were asked to predict their exam scores one month before the exam and
then again at intervals that grew increasingly closer to actually receiving their true
exam score. Results showed that students began with more optimistic predictions,
which may have functioned to keep their confidence elevated going into the exam,
but they progressively shifted to more pessimistic predictions the closer they got
to receiving the true scores, which may have functioned to manage their anxiety
(for related examples of situational shifts in prediction biases, see Armor & Sackett, 2006; Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993). Thus, people do appear to be sensitive
to the possible consequences of optimism or pessimism and to gravitate toward
either outlook based on which of these consequences is currently more advantageous.
One important implication of the intuitive functionalist framework is that people may selectively use optimistic or pessimistic outlooks as strategies to aid selfregulation (see also Norem & Cantor, 1986). That is, people may specifically choose
to adopt optimistic or pessimistic outlooks as a means to help themselves sustain
a particular motivational orientation. If people are motivated to maximize their efforts toward ensuring positive outcomes, then it would be more advantageous to
adopt an optimistic outlook that allows them to maintain their orientation toward
attaining these outcomes better than a pessimistic outlook. Alternatively, if people
are motivated to maximize their efforts for guarding against negative outcomes,
then it would be more advantageous to adopt a pessimistic outlook that allows
them to maintain their orientation toward protecting against these outcomes better than an optimistic outlook. The present research investigates this self-regu-
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latory perspective on forecasting preferences by examining how motivations for
attainment, growth, and advancement versus for maintenance, safety, and security
are associated with people’s use of optimistic or pessimistic outlooks during goal
pursuit.

Motivating Optimistic or Pessimistic
Forecasting Preferences
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) posits two distinct motivational orientations that determine how people approach desired outcomes and avoid undesired
outcomes. A promotion orientation is centered on advancement concerns and the
focus is on approaching the presence of gains and avoiding the absence of gains
(i.e., non-gains). Promotion-oriented goal pursuit is thus characterized by motivations for attaining growth and supports eager strategies of seeking possible gains
even at the risk of committing errors or accepting some loss. In contrast, a prevention orientation is centered on security concerns and the focus is on approaching the
absence of losses (i.e., non-losses) and avoiding the presence of losses. Preventionoriented goal pursuit is thus characterized by motivation for maintaining security and supports vigilant strategies of protecting against possible losses even at
the risk of missing opportunities or potential gains. Much research has confirmed
that both chronic and temporarily induced concerns with promotion or prevention consistently produce these types of strategic preferences during goal pursuit
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001; see Molden,
Lee, & Higgins, 2008).
We propose that preferences for an optimistic outlook will be associated with a
promotion orientation because optimism maintains eager goal pursuit. That is, an
optimistic outlook orients people toward potential gains and motivates them to
pursue strategies to achieve these gains. Therefore optimism should be perceived
as more functional when motivated by promotion concerns. Moreover, these gainfocused, optimistic mindsets should provide a better match to promotion-focused
individuals’ current self-regulatory state and thus create greater experiences of
engagement, or regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000), which can then lead to improved
performance (Bianco, Higgins, & Klem, 2003; Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Freitas,
Liberman, & Higgins, 2002). Similarly, we propose that preferences for a pessimistic outlook will be associated with a prevention orientation because pessimism
maintains vigilant goal pursuit. That is, a pessimistic outlook orients people toward potential losses and motivates them to pursue strategies that guard against
such losses. Therefore, pessimism should be perceived as more functional when
motivated by prevention concerns, and these loss-focused, pessimistic mindsets
should create greater engagement and regulatory fit for prevention-focused individuals, which could again lead to improved performance.
Several lines of existing research on regulatory focus support these proposed
links between promotion concerns and a preference for optimism, and between
prevention concerns and a preference for pessimism. First, Grant and Higgins
(2003) found that although both a stronger chronic focus on promotion and a
stronger chronic focus on prevention are correlated with indices of well-being and
an active coping style, only a promotion focus is correlated with dispositional optimism. That is, the positive outcomes associated with a promotion focus were
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found to be at least partially mediated by an optimistic outlook, but the positive
outcomes associated with a prevention-focus were not related to this outlook. Although this study did not include any measure of dispositional pessimism (e.g.,
Norem & Cantor, 1986), it does provide suggestive evidence that the motivational
benefits of a promotion focus are at least partially due to increased optimism but
that the motivational benefits of a prevention focus are unrelated to optimism.
Further work by Forster, Grant, Idson, and Higgins (2001) shows that whereas
positive, success-oriented feedback maintains a promotion orientation, negative,
failure-oriented feedback maintains a prevention orientation. In two studies, Forster and colleagues (2001) measured motivational intensity using arm pressure
(Study 1) and task persistence (Study 2) while participants solved anagrams after
being primed with promotion or prevention concerns. As predicted, promotionfocused participants showed more motivational intensity and engagement following the success (versus failure) feedback, while prevention-focused participants
showed more motivational intensity and engagement following the failure (versus
success) feedback. Similarly, Idson and Higgins (2000) demonstrated that chronically promotion-focused individuals show increased performance over time after
success feedback, whereas chronically prevention-focused individuals show increased performance after failure feedback. Because an optimistic mindset essentially involves generating one’s own internal positive expectancies and thoughts
about success, these findings suggest that such a mindset might also produce regulatory fit and improve performance when promotion-focused. In contrast, because
a pessimistic mindset essentially involves generating one’s own internal negative
expectancies and thoughts about failure, these findings suggest that such a mindset might also produce regulatory fit and improve performance when preventionfocused (see also Langens, 2007).
In summary, incorporating a regulatory focus perspective with the intuitive
functionalist account of forecasting preferences leads to the hypotheses that (a)
promotion-focused individuals will be more likely to prefer optimistic forecasting
preferences and will show increased engagement and performance when adopting such preferences, whereas (b) prevention-focused individuals will show more
pessimistic forecasting preferences, and will show increased engagement and performance when adopting such preferences.
These hypotheses were tested across three studies. Study 1 examined the simple
associations between chronic motivations for promotion or prevention and general preferences for optimistic, pessimistic, or realistic outlooks during goal pursuit.
Study 2 then examined these same associations in the context of people’s performance on an upcoming task and further tested the impact of such associations on
performance. Finally, Study 3 more closely investigated the impact of optimistic
or pessimistic mindsets on promotion- or prevention-focused individuals’ engagement and performance by directly manipulating these mindsets in the context of
a problem-solving task.

Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to establish initial evidence for the predicted relationships between promotion motivations and optimism and between prevention
motivations and pessimism. To do this, we tested for correlations between indi-
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viduals’ chronic regulatory focus and their stated preferences for optimism and
pessimism over realism. To the extent that these two different outlooks are specifically seen as functional for promotion or prevention motivational orientations,
then optimism should be preferred over realistic forecasting by those who are
promotion-oriented, while pessimism should be preferred over realistic forecasting by those who are prevention-oriented. Furthermore, promotion-focused individuals should report a greater tendency to engage in optimistic thought, whereas
prevention-focused individuals should report a greater tendency to engage in pessimistic thought.

Method
Participants. Participants were 361 students from the Psychology 110 subject pool
at Northwestern University who completed the study for partial fulfillment of
course credit. The sample was 41% male (N = 147) and 58% female (N = 210) with
1% (N = 4) not reporting gender. The mean age of the sample was 18.72 (SD = .91)
years and ranged from 18 to 22 years.
Materials and Procedure. As part of a large group-testing session, participants first
completed a previously validated 11-item measure of chronic regulatory focus
(RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001; see also Grant & Higgins, 2003). Items on this scale
ask participants to read a series of statements that tap into their general tendency
to engage in promotion-focused self-regulation (e.g., “I have often accomplished
things that got me ‘psyched’ to work even harder”) or prevention-focused selfregulation (e.g., “I often obeyed rules and regulations that were established by my
parents”) and rate the extent to which each statement is generally true of them on
a 1 (Completely Disagree) to 5 (Completely Agree) scale.
After completing several unrelated measures, participants then were given a
5-item measure of forecasting preferences adapted from Sackett and Armor (2010).
The instructions first read: “When thinking about how things will turn out in the
future it is not always possible to be completely accurate. Please answer the following questions based on how you generally think about future events in your
life.” Participants were then asked “When making predictions about future events
it is better to be . . . ” and made ratings on two different 7-point scales, one of which
had the endpoints pessimistic and realistic, and one of which had the endpoints
realistic and optimistic. Both scales were numbered from -3 to +3 with the midpoint
(i.e., 0) labeled indifferent, indicating no preference between the two choices at the
endpoints. In this way, we were able to assess people’s preferences for optimism
or pessimism in comparison to a more realistic outlook, which is the most direct
way to test how functional individuals perceive these outlooks to be.1 After these
measures, participants then completed three additional items that asked them to
rate how often their own predictions about the future tended to be “optimistic,”
“pessimistic,” and “realistic” on a scale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always).
1. Although some research suggests that optimism and pessimism are a single construct (see
Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), there is also compelling evidence that when treated as two separate
variables they predict different things (e.g., Kubzansky, Kubzansky, & Maselko, 2004; RobinsonWhelen, Kim, MacCallum, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1997). Thus, we chose to measure them separately to
allow for the best understanding of how each construct is related to the outcomes of interest.
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TABLE 1. Correlations Between Predominant Promotion Concerns, Personal Forecasting Tendencies,
and General Forecasting Preferences (Study 1)

Promotion Concerns

Optimism

Pessimism

Realism

Optimism >
Realism

Pessimism >
Realism

.26**

-.19**

.03

.12*

-.10†

—

-.61**

.08

.43**

-.16**

—

-.09†

-.35**

.15**

—

-.18**

-.20**

—

.06

Optimism
Pessimism
Realism
Optimism > Realism
Pessimism > Realism

—

Note. †p < .08; *p < .05; **p < .01.

Results and Discussion
Following the procedures established in previous research, participants’ chronic
motivations for promotion or prevention scores were calculated by separately averaging their scores on the promotion-oriented (α = .67) and prevention-oriented
items (α = .79). An index of participants’ predominant regulatory focus was then
created by subtracting the prevention score from the promotion score.2 Although
people can vary in the strength of both their promotion and prevention motivations, in the current research we are interested in the relative strength of participants’ preference for eager versus vigilant modes of goal-pursuit, and how this
relative preference is related to the optimistic or pessimistic mindsets that might fit
with such modes of goal pursuit. This index of predominant regulatory focus has
been used in numerous published studies (see Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004;
Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Higgins et al., 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2008). More positive scores on this index indicate a predominant promotion focus, whereas more
negative scores indicate a predominant prevention focus.
Table 1 shows that, as predicted, a predominant promotion focus was associated
with favoring optimistic forecasting and with reporting a greater tendency to personally adopt an optimistic outlook, whereas a predominant prevention focus was
associated with favoring pessimistic forecasting and with reporting a greater tendency to personally adopt a pessimistic outlook. That is, more positive scores on
the regulatory focus index showed significant positive correlations with (a) general preferences for optimistic as compared to realistic forecasting strategies, and
(b) reports of personally making optimistic predictions. In contrast, more positive
scores on the regulatory focus index showed significant (or marginal) negative
correlations with (a) general preferences for pessimistic as compared to realistic
forecasting strategies, and (b) reports of personally making pessimistic predictions. There was no correlation between participants’ scores on the regulatory focus index and their reports of generally making realistic predictions.
This pattern of results indicates that, as hypothesized, motivations for promotion or prevention were related to preferences for optimistic or pessimistic self2. Scores on the promotion and prevention subscales had a small but marginally significant
positive correlation in this sample, r = .10, t(359) = 1.85, p = .06.
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regulatory strategies, respectively, even when judged against the alternative of
attempting to be as realistic (i.e., accurate) as possible. Furthermore, these general
preferences were also reflected in participants’ reports of their own forecasting
behavior. However, although Study 1 provides evidence for the general association between regulatory focus and preferences for particular forecasting strategies,
it did not assess whether these same preferences are evident during pursuit of a
specific goal or how using one’s preferred strategies might further influence goal
pursuit. Study 2 was therefore designed to address these limitations by measuring
forecasting preferences for performance on a specific task and investigating how
the predicted differences in forecasting preferences for those with a predominant
promotion or prevention orientation relate to actual task performance.

Study 2
In Study 2, chronically promotion-focused or prevention-focused participants
were again asked to report their preferences for optimistic or pessimistic forecasting strategies, but this time concerning an upcoming problem-solving task. After
stating their preferences, participants then completed this task, which consisted
of solving a series of anagrams. If promotion-focused individuals not only prefer
optimistic forecasting strategies, but also benefit motivationally from using such
strategies, then these individuals should perform better when displaying an optimistic forecasting preference. Similarly, if prevention-focused individuals not only
prefer pessimistic forecasting strategies, but also benefit motivationally from using such strategies, then these individuals should perform better when displaying
a pessimistic forecasting preference

Method
Participants. Participants were 32 volunteers who completed the study online
after following a link from the Social Psychology Network website (www.socialpsychology.org). Participants were not compensated for their participation in this
study. No demographic information was recorded.
Materials and Procedures. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was
“to help us learn more about the psychological processes that occur when people
think in optimistic, pessimistic, or realistic ways.” They then completed the same
measure of their promotion or prevention motivations as in Study 1 (RFQ; Higgins
et al., 2001). Following the RFQ, participants read a brief explanation of anagram
word problems and were told that they would complete 12 anagrams and answer
questions about their predictions for their own performance on this task. All the
anagrams used in this study had multiple solutions (some using all of the letters,
some using only a subset of the letters) and participants were instructed to find as
many solutions as they could.
Before beginning the anagram task, participants completed a two-item measure
of forecasting preferences similar to the measure used in Study 1. Participants first
read the following instructions: “We’re interested in how people make predictions
about their performance on this task. Naturally, it’s rare for such predictions to be
100% accurate. Instead, people’s predictions are usually either somewhat optimis-
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TABLE 2. Correlations between Predominant Promotion Concerns and Forecasting Preferences (Study
2)
Optimism > Realism

Pessimism > Realism

Promotion Concerns

.49**

-.55**

Optimism > Realism

—

-.62**

Pessimism > Realism

—

Note. **p < .01.

tic (i.e., expecting a better outcome than is achieved) or somewhat pessimistic (i.e.,
expecting a worse outcome than is achieved). On the page that follows, we would
like you to answer some questions about your own predictions with these definitions of ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ in mind.” Participants then rated their own
forecasting preferences for (a) pessimism versus realism and (b) realism versus
optimism using the same scale as described in Study 1. Following the forecasting
preference ratings participants completed the anagram task and their correct solutions were tallied.

Results and Discussion
An index of participants’ predominant regulatory focus was calculated from responses to the promotion (α = .73) and prevention (α = .75) subscales of the RFQ
in the same way as described in Study 1.3 More positive scores on this index again
indicated a predominant promotion focus whereas more negative scores indicated
a predominant prevention focus.
Forecasting Preferences for a Specific Goal. Table 2 shows that, again as predicted,
a predominant promotion focus was associated with more optimistic forecasting
preferences, whereas a predominant prevention focus was associated with more
pessimistic forecasting preferences. More positive scores on the regulatory focus
index showed significant positive correlations with greater preferences for optimistic as compared to realistic forecasting strategies. In contrast, more positive
scores on the regulatory focus index showed a significant negative correlation with
greater preferences for pessimistic as compared to realistic forecasting strategies.
This pattern of results replicates and extends the findings of Study 1. In addition to the broad preferences for optimistic forecasting preferences previously
observed, promotion-focused individuals also displayed similar preferences for
a specific upcoming task. Thus, regulatory focus is related not only to an abstract
endorsement of optimism or pessimism, but also to the specific choice of these
outlooks in preparation for goal pursuit.
Effects of Regulatory Focus and Forecasting Preferences on Performance. On average,
participants found 16.91 (SD = 11.01) correct solutions to the anagram problems.
In order to further examine whether the forecasting preferences chosen by promotion-focused or prevention-focused individuals were related to the number of
solutions found, a series of hierarchical linear regression analyses were conducted
3. Scores on the promotion and prevention subscales were not significantly correlated in this
sample, r = .11, t(30) = .59, p = .56.
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in which the total number of correct solutions was predicted by the main effects of
forecasting preferences and regulatory focus in a first step, followed by the forecasting preference x regulatory focus interaction in a second step.
When considering effects on performance of preferences for realism versus optimism, there were marginal main effects for forecasting preference, β = -.35, t(27)
= -1.71, p = .10, and regulatory focus, β = .38, t(27) = 1.71, p = .10; however, these
trends were qualified by a significant interaction, β = .43, t(26) = 2.28, p = .03. To determine the nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West,
1991) were performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero point on the regulatory
focus index (indicating promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals,
respectively) and at 1.5 SD above or below the midpoint of the forecasting preference measure (indicating a preference for optimistic or realistic forecasts, respectively). 4 As shown in Figure 1a, among those who preferred optimistic forecasts,
performance was significantly higher if they also were promotion-focused as compared to prevention-focused, β = 1.65, t(26) = 2.91, p < .01. In contrast, as shown in
Figure 1b, among those who preferred realistic forecasts there was no significant
performance difference between those who were promotion-focused as compared
to prevention focused, β = -.27, t(26) = -.56, p = .58.
When considering effects on performance of preferences for pessimism versus
realism, there were no significant main effects for forecasting preference, β = .03,
t(27) = .13, p = .90, or for regulatory focus, β = .03, t(27) = .15, p = .88; however, there
was a significant interaction, β = .42, t(26) = 2.30, p = .03. To further explore the
nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991) were
again performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero-point on the regulatory focus
index and at 1.5 SD above or below the midpoint of the forecasting preference
measure (indicating a preference for realistic or pessimistic forecasts, respectively).
As shown in Figure 2a, among those who preferred pessimistic forecasts, performance trended lower (albeit only suggestively instead of significantly) if they also
were promotion focused as compared to prevention focused, β = -.83, t(26) = -1.67,
p = .11. In contrast, as shown in Figure 2b, among those who preferred realistic
forecasts performance was marginally higher if they were also promotion-focused
as compared to prevention focused, β = 1.06, t(26) = 1.96, p = .06.
Overall, these results suggest that favoring optimistic forecasts over realistic
forecasts was associated with higher performance for promotion-focused than
prevention-focused participants, whereas favoring realistic forecasts over pessimistic forecasts was associated with lower performance for prevention-focused
than promotion-focused participants. This pattern of results lends support to our
hypothesis that, in addition to associations with the types of forecasting strategies
that are preferred, people’s predominant regulatory focus is also associated with
how the use of these strategies relates to performance.
4
Although simple effects are commonly tested at +/-1 SD, Aiken and West (1991) note that
the selection of these values is essentially arbitrary. We chose to conduct these analyses at +/-1.5
SD because these values better capture people who are clearly predominant in one motivational
orientation and/or mindset. That is, values of +/- 1 SD are roughly equivalent to the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the scale assuming a normal distribution. Using +/-1.5 SD shifts the focus to the 15th
and 85th percentiles of the scale; thus examining these more extreme points in the distribution better
represents the concept of predominant orientations that is the focus of these analyses. When the same
analyses were conducted at +/- 1 SD the pattern that emerged was virtually the same as the findings
reported here.
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Figure 1. The association between regulatory focus and performance among (a) those who
preferred optimism over realism and (b) those who preferred realism over optimism (Study 2).

In Study 2, we measured people’s reports of their general forecasting preferences for optimism or pessimism before an anagram task and then used these
preferences to predict performance on the task. Although participants who endorsed optimistic or pessimistic preferences were presumably more likely to generate optimistic or pessimistic thoughts in anticipation of the anagram task, we do
not yet have any direct evidence that these thoughts are what caused the performance differences. To provide such evidence, Study 3 further tests the relationship
between regulatory focus, optimistic or pessimistic forecasting preferences, and
performance by manipulating the forecasting preferences that participants used
before a task. Furthermore, if performance differences associated with forecasting
preferences and regulatory focus are indeed due to regulatory fit, then these dif-
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Endorse Pessimism Over Realism
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Endorse Realism Over Pessimism

Performance (Higher = Better)

40

30

20

10

0
-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Prevention Motivations Predominant (left) vs. Promotion Motivations Predominant (right)

2b
Figure 2. The association between regulatory focus and performance among (a) those who
preferred pessimism over realism and (b) those who preferred realism over pessimism (Study
2).

ferences should be mediated by differences in task engagement (Freitas & Higgins,
2002; Freitas et al., 2002; see Higgins, 2006). Therefore, Study 3 tests this additional
possibility as well.

Study 3
In Study 3, chronically promotion-focused or prevention-focused participants were
informed that they would be completing a problem-solving task and then asked
to rehearse either a set of optimistic or pessimistic thoughts. If it is these types of
thoughts that are responsible for the association of people’s forecasting preferences with their task performance demonstrated previously, then after rehears-
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ing optimistic thoughts, promotion-focused participants should perform better
than prevention-focused participants, but after rehearsing pessimistic thoughts,
prevention-focused participants should perform better than promotion-focused
participants. In addition, to assess participants’ engagement as well as their performance, this study also included measures of task engagement in terms of persistence at the task.

Method
Participants. Participants were 84 students from the Psych 110 subject pool at
Northwestern University who took part in this study for partial fulfillment of
course credit. The sample was 48% male (N = 40) and 50% female (N = 42) with
2% (N = 2) not reporting gender. The mean age of the sample was 19.05 (SD = 1.28)
years and ranged from 17 to 25 years.
Materials and Procedure. Participants reviewed all instructions and completed all
tasks on a computer in a private cubicle. To provide additional convergent validity for our general findings, participants completed a different measure of chronic
regulatory focus than was used in Studies 1 and 2. Instead of participants’ selfreports of their promotion or prevention motivations, this measure, developed by
Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997) is based upon the chronic activation (i.e., accessibility) of participants’ own promotion-focused and prevention-focused goals.
Just as chronic attitude accessibility can serve as an index of attitude strength (e.g.,
Fazio, 1995), much research has shown that chronic accessibility for promotionand prevention-relevant goals can serve as indices of motivational strength (e.g.,
Higgins et al., 1997; Liberman et al., 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2004, 2008). The
regulatory-focus strength measure used in Study 3 therefore asked participants to
list, one at a time and in a seemingly random order, four of their own promotionrelevant goals (i.e., their advancement-oriented hopes and aspirations) and four of
their own prevention-relevant goals (i.e., their security-oriented duties and obligations). After each entry, participants rated both the extent to which they aspired
(or felt obligated) to achieve this goal, and the extent to which they had actually
achieved it. Participants’ reaction times (RTs) for both the goal-listing and goalrating tasks were recorded by the computer. After log-transforming all RTs and
multiplying them by -1 so that higher values (i.e., smaller response latencies) equal
greater strength, all the RTs concerning aspirations were then summed to calculate
promotion strength (α = .73), and all the RTs concerning obligations were then
summed to calculate prevention strength (α = .67; for complete details see Higgins
et al., 1997).5
Following the regulatory-focus strength measure, participants then read a brief
description of an anagram task they were about to perform. Before engaging in
this task, half of the participants were randomly assigned to generate optimistic
thoughts about their performance on this task and the other half were assigned to
5. Scores on the promotion and prevention subscales were significantly positively correlated in
this sample, r = .55, t(82) = 5.92, p < .001. However, this correlation is to be expected given that the
measure of regulatory focus in this study was based off of reaction times on which people show
stable individual differences. The primary consequence of such colinearity is to reduce power and
make differential effects more difficult to detect, making the differences observed in this study all the
more notable.
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generate pessimistic thoughts about their performance. Optimistic or pessimistic
thoughts were elicited using a procedure adapted from Sanna (1996). Participants
were presented with five statements (e.g., “I am confident that I can accomplish
this task well”; “I have a bad feeling about my performance on this task”) one at
a time on the computer screen and then were asked to write at least one sentence
describing how the statement might be true for them in the upcoming task. The
full text of all of the statements is included in Appendix A. In this way, participants
in the optimism condition were guided to take an optimistic outlook on their performance and those in the pessimism condition were guided to take a pessimistic
outlook on their performance.
Participants next completed a set of 16 anagrams taken from Shah, Higgins, and
Friedman (1998), all of which had multiple possible solutions. They were told to
find as many solutions as they could for each anagram. As a measure of engagement on the task, the computer recorded how much time participants spent on
each anagram before moving onto the next one. Overall engagement and task persistence was determined by calculating the total time participants spent on the
anagram task. To create a measure for performance, the total number of valid solutions found for all 16 anagrams were summed. Finally, as a manipulation check,
participants rated how they would describe the statements they made about their
potential performance before the task on a -3 (Pessimistic) to +3 (Optimistic) scale.

Results and Discussion
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, an index of participants’ predominant regulatory focus
was calculated from their RTs on the regulatory focus strength measure by subtracting their transformed RTs to their prevention-focused goals from their transformed RTs to their promotion-focused goals (see Higgins et al., 1997; Molden &
Higgins, 2008). More positive scores on this index again indicate a predominant
promotion focus, whereas more negative scores indicate a predominant prevention focus
Manipulation Checks. In order to ensure that the optimistic versus pessimistic
outlook manipulation was effective, a hierarchical linear regression was conducted in which responses to how participants characterized the preparatory statements before the task were predicted by the main effects of the outlook condition
(coded as 0 for pessimism or 1 for optimism) and predominant regulatory focus
in a first step, followed by the outlook condition x regulatory focus interaction in
a second step. There was no significant main effect of regulatory focus strength,
β = -.05, t(81) = -.61, p = .54, but a significant main effect for outlook condition, β
= -1.16, t(81) = -6.47, p < .001: Those in the optimistic outlook condition rated the
statements as being significantly more optimistic (M = 1.41, SD = 1.26) than those
in the pessimistic outlook condition (M = -1.05, SD = 2.02). There was no significant interaction between regulatory focus strength and outlook condition, β = -.24,
t(80) = -1.34, p = .18. Thus, as expected, those in the optimism condition rated the
statements as more optimistic than those in the pessimism condition regardless of
their regulatory focus.
Task Performance. On average, participants found 18.67 (SD = 7.33) correct solutions to the anagram problems. A hierarchical linear regression was conducted
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Figure 3. The interaction between induced optimistic or induced pessimistic forecasts and
regulatory focus on task performance (Study 3).

in which participants’ correct solutions were predicted by the main effects of the
outlook condition (coded as 0 for pessimism or 1 for optimism) and their predominant regulatory focus in a first step, followed by the outlook condition x regulatory
focus interaction in a second step. There was no significant main effect for regulatory focus strength, β = -.10, t(81) = -.93, p = .35, nor for outlook condition, β = -.08,
t(81) = -.15, p = .88. However, there was a significant interaction effect between regulatory focus and outlook condition, β = -.67, t(80) = -2.11, p = .04. To determine the
nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991) were
performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero point on the regulatory focus index
(indicating promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals, respectively)
within each of the outlook conditions. As shown in Figure 3, in the optimism condition, performance was nonsignificantly higher for promotion-focused participants (Mpredicted = 20.83) than prevention-focused participants (Mpredicted = 19.40),
β = .23, t(80) = 0.99, p = .32. In contrast, in the pessimism condition, performance
was significantly higher for prevention-focused participants (Mpredicted = 18.13) than
promotion-focused participants (Mpredicted = 11.67) , β = -.44, t(80) = -2.03, p = .04.
Task Engagement. On average, participants spent 451.56 seconds (SD = 252.35)
working on the anagram problems. A hierarchical linear regression was conducted
in which participants’ engagement (total time) was predicted by the main effects
of the outlook condition (coded as 0 for pessimism or 1 for optimism) and their
predominant regulatory focus in a first step, followed by the outlook condition x
regulatory focus interaction in a second step. There was no significant main effect
for regulatory focus strength, β = .06, t(81) = .59, p = .55, and there was a marginally significant main effect for outlook condition, β = -.39, t(81) = -1.79, p = .08.
However, this effect was again qualified by a significant interaction effect between
regulatory focus and outlook condition, β = -.47, t(80) = 2.22, p = .03. To determine
the nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991)
were again performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero point on the regulatory
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focus index (indicating promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals,
respectively) within each of the outlook conditions. As shown in Figure 4, in the
optimism condition, engagement was significantly higher for promotion-focused
participants (Mpredicted = 687.90) than prevention-focused participants (Mpredicted =
446.04), β = .48, t(80) = 2.04, p = .04. In contrast, in the pessimism condition, engagement was nonsignificantly higher for prevention-focused participants (Mpredic= 419.02) than promotion-focused participants (Mpredicted = 302.35), β = -.23, t(80)
ted
= -1.06, p = .29.
Mediation Analyses. The effect of the interaction between regulatory focus and
optimistic or pessimistic forecasts on performance and engagement as established
in the previous sections suggest the possibility that engagement may mediate the
relationship between the regulatory focus and forecasting and performance. In
other words, it may be that when promotion-oriented individuals make optimistic
forecasts and prevention-oriented individuals make pessimistic forecasts, engagement in the task increases and their performance is improved. This mediational
relationship would be consistent with previous regulatory fit findings and would
support our hypothesis that different forecasting preferences serve to maintain
difference modes of self-regulation.
In order to test for mediation, a linear regression was conducted in which participants’ correct solutions were predicted by the main effects of outlook, chronic
regulatory focus, and task engagement (time spent on the problem set), along with
the outlook condition x regulatory focus interaction. In this analysis, the main effect of engagement on performance was significant, β = .49, t(79) = 4.87, p < .001,
and the previously significant outlook condition x regulatory focus interaction
was no longer significant, β = -.21, t(79) = -1.06, p = .29, suggesting meditation
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). A follow-up Sobel test demonstrated that the indirect effect
of regulatory focus on performance through task engagement was indeed significant, z = 1.99, p = .04.6
The results of Study 3 thus provided additional evidence for the different influence of optimistic or pessimistic forecasts on engagement and performance for
promotion-focused versus prevention-focused individuals. Prevention-focused individuals were nonsignificantly more engaged and performed significantly better
than promotion-focused individuals when asked to generate pessimistic thoughts
before an anagram task, whereas promotion-focused individuals were significantly more engaged and performed nonsignificantly better than prevention-focused
individuals when asked to generate optimistic thoughts before this task. Moreover, supporting a regulatory fit interpretation of these effects, the pattern of differences in performance shown by promotion-focused and prevention-focused
participants were mediated by the pattern of differences in their engagement with
(i.e., persistence on) the anagram task.

6. Recently, the use of bootstrapping techniques for mediational analysis (Preacher & Hayes,
2008) has been recommended by many. We therefore also tested for mediation using the MCMAM
method (Bauer, Preacher, & Gil, 2006) and the results reconfirmed significant mediation, with a 95%
confidence interval for the indirect effect between -1.5 and -.08.
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Figure 4. The interaction between induced optimistic or induced pessimistic forecasts and
regulatory focus on task engagement (Study 3).

General Discussion
Past research has demonstrated the presence of optimistic (e.g., Weinstein, 1980)
and pessimistic (e.g., Norem & Cantor, 1986) biases and provided arguments for
the functionality of both outlooks (see Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Scheier & Carver, 1993). Given that both outlooks may convey some benefits, Sackett and Armor
(2010) have more recently begun to develop a framework for understanding when
and why people might selectively shift between an optimistic or pessimistic outlook (see also Armor et al., 2008). The present research expands on this perspective by investigating motivational orientations that help predict when one outlook
over the other may be beneficial during goal pursuit. Specifically, we hypothesized
that motivations for promotion, which focus on gains and advancement, should
be related to and sustained by a preference for optimistic forecasts, which tend to
produce eagerness for gains. In contrast, we hypothesized that motivations for
prevention, which focus on security and protection from loss, should be related
to and sustained by a preference for pessimistic forecasts, which tend to produce
vigilance against loss.
These hypotheses were generally supported across three studies using two different measures of chronic motivations for promotion or prevention. Studies 1 and
2 demonstrated that a chronic focus on promotion was correlated with reported
preferences and tendencies toward making optimistic forecasts, whereas a chronic focus on prevention was correlated with reported preferences and tendencies
toward making pessimistic forecasts. This favoring of optimistic or pessimistic
forecasts was found when each was contrasted with realistic forecasts, which we
interpret as evidence that participants view these outlooks as potentially more
beneficial than being accurate in their forecasts. We suggest that this added value
over realism may reflect the motivational maintenance function of optimism for
promotion-oriented individuals and pessimism for prevention-oriented individuals. Further supporting this motivational maintenance prediction—as shown in
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Study 2—this pattern of results emerged not only for people’s generally stated
preferences, but also for their preferences concerning a specific task that they were
preparing to complete.
Studies 2 and 3 further demonstrated that optimistic forecasting preferences led
to greater engagement and performance among promotion-focused participants,
whereas pessimistic forecasting preferences led to greater engagement and performance among prevention-focused participants. Because all of the specific comparisons between the associations between the forecasting preferences of promotion-focused and prevention-focused participants and their performance did not
always reach conventional levels of statistical significance within each study, we
conducted separate meta-analyses of these comparisons for optimistic and pessimistic mindsets. To derive the meta-analytic effect size across studies, the standardized regression coefficients for the regulatory focus index in each of the relevant
analyses was weighted by the reciprocal of its variance and then averaged across
studies. The standard error for this average effect was calculated as the average
of the square root of the reciprocal of the weights (see Greenland & Longnecker,
1987). Combining the regulatory focus effect among those preferring optimistic
over realistic forecasts in Study 2 and those induced to make optimistic forecasts in
Study 3 revealed a significant overall effect, z = 2.22, p = .03. Similarly, combining
the regulatory focus effect among those preferring pessimistic over realistic forecasts in Study 2 and those induced to make pessimistic forecasts in Study 3 also
revealed a significant overall effect, z = -2.40, p = .02. Thus, overall, these studies
support the conclusions that optimistic mindsets improved performance for promotion-focused individuals and that pessimistic mindsets improved performance
for prevention-focused individuals to a generally equivalent degree. Finally, Study
3 provided direct evidence that these performance differences shown by promotion- or prevention-focused individuals were mediated by differences in task engagement, which supports a regulatory fit interpretation of these effects.
The present research extends prior research on optimism and pessimism in several ways. First, the consideration of motivational influences on forecasting preferences extends the framework proposed by Sackett and Armor (2010; Armor et al.,
2008) by providing a general motivational perspective that explains why optimistic or pessimistic outlooks are beneficial when adopted by those with a promotion or prevention focus, respectively. Because optimism encourages a focus on
potential positive outcomes, it generally fits a promotion focus and is functional
for maintaining promotion-oriented goal pursuit. On the other hand, because pessimism encourages a focus on potential negative outcomes, it generally fits a prevention focus and is functional for maintaining prevention-oriented goal pursuit
(see Higgins, 2000). Thus, the present research incorporates research on regulatory
fit (Higgins, 2000) with current perspectives on the function of optimistic and pessimistic biases (Sackett & Armor, 2010).
A second contribution of the present studies to research on optimism and pessimism is that they help to unify the somewhat conflicting literature on the benefits of optimism (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1993) and the benefits of pessimism (e.g.,
Norem & Illingworth, 1993). On the whole, our findings suggest that optimistic
and pessimistic forecasting preferences can each serve an important functional
purpose depending upon one’s current motivational orientation. Optimism can
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perhaps allow people to engage in positive coping and adjustment (e.g., Taylor &
Armor, 1988), as long as people are promotion-focused and disposed toward more
eager, gain-focused means of goal pursuit. However, when people are preventionfocused, our findings suggest that these eager means may not motivate the same
coping and adjustment when challenged. Furthermore, pessimism can perhaps
allow people to reduce their anxiety (e.g., Norem & Illingworth, 1993) about engaging in particular activities that help them achieve their goals, as long as people
are prevention-focused and disposed toward more vigilant, loss-focused means of
goal pursuit. However, when people are promotion-focused, our findings suggest
that these vigilant means might not motivate anxiety reduction or task engagement in the same way. Therefore, the present studies help to integrate the sometimes disparate perspectives on the functional value of optimism and pessimism
by providing a motivational account of when and why each outlook can sustain
engagement and performance.
Beyond these contributions to research on optimism and pessimism, the present studies also extend previous research on regulatory focus and goal pursuit.
Previous studies (Forster et al., 2001; Idson & Higgins, 2000) have shown that promotion-focused individuals are more engaged and persistent when they receive
positive feedback about their initial performance, whereas prevention-focused individuals are more engaged and persistent when they receive negative feedback.
The present studies suggest that not only do people respond in this manner to
different types of external feedback, but that they also attempt to internally generate this feedback themselves by adopting optimistic or pessimistic mindsets. That
is, as most directly indicated by Study 2, at times people may attempt to self-generate regulatory fit to maintain persistence and performance. Furthermore, theses
results were demonstrated across multiple methodologies with both self-report
measures of chronic regulatory focus (Studies 1 and 2) and an implicit responsetime measure of chronic regulatory focus activation (Study 3).
Although the present work suggests that promotion motivations are related to
optimism and prevention motivations are related to pessimism, it is important to
note that these motivational orientations are not simple proxies for dispositional
optimism or pessimism. Indeed, while Grant and Higgins (2003) found that chronic promotion orientation was related to dispositional optimism, the size of this
correlation was modest (r = .33) and suggests that these constructs are not entirely
overlapping. Additionally, while defensive pessimism is usually defined and measured in the relatively narrow terms of a disparity between positive performance
history and negative performance expectancy (see Norem & Cantor, 1986), the
present work provides a broader motivational framework (i.e., prevention motivations) for understanding the origins and strategic value of this type of response.
The theoretical advances in predicting and understanding people’s forecasting
preferences that are provided by the present findings thus open the door to additional studies that further elaborate on the motivational dynamics of optimism
and pessimism. That is, individual differences in motivations for promotion or
prevention is just one of many factors that might explain when and why people
choose optimistic or pessimistic outlooks. Given that all existing research on the
intuitive functionalist perspective on forecasting preferences has been conducted
in the United States, one clear direction for future research would be to examine
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whether different cultural contexts can also motivate different forecasting preferences through lay theories or cultural norms.
Future research could also address some of the limitations of the present studies.
The scales used to measure preferences for optimism and pessimism were quite
short and relied on simple self-report. While these scales have the advantage of
being face-valid and easy to administer, it is also possible that using more comprehensive measures of preferences for optimism and pessimism would enhance
our understanding of the relationship between motivational orientation and forecasting preferences. Additionally, while optimistic and pessimistic outlooks were
both measured (Studies 1 and 2) and manipulated (Study 3) in the present research, regulatory focus was always measured and never manipulated. Therefore,
another important direction for future research is to further examine how and why
systematic differences in optimistic or pessimistic forecasting preferences shift in
response to different situations in which broader motivations relevant for these
preferences might be temporarily activated. Much previous research has shown
that a promotion or prevention focus can be temporarily activated by a variety of
momentary experiences or incentives (e.g., Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Molden,
Lucas, Gardner, Dean, & Knowles, 2009; Seibt & Forster, 2004; Shah et al., 1998; see
Molden et al., 2008). If such temporary activation of people’s regulatory focus can
reproduce the same forecasting preferences and performance differences as demonstrated here, it would further extend the intuitive functionalist perspective proposed by Sackett and Armor (2010) and have important implications for designing
interventions to boost performance in circumstances that generally evoke promotion motivations (e.g., making new friends, increasing one’s physical fitness) or
prevention motivations (e.g., saving for retirement, maintaining one’s health). In
addition, circumstances in which other broad motivations that activate more optimistic or pessimistic outlooks could be identified as well.

Conclusion
Given the difficulty of accurately predicting the future, people may instead be left
with a choice of whether to try to err on the side of optimistic or pessimistic forecasts. The present research reveals both theoretical and behavioral implications
of such choices by demonstrating that motivations for advancement (e.g., promotion) are more compatible with, and better sustained by, an optimistic outlook,
whereas motivations for security (e.g., prevention) are more compatible with, and
better sustained by, a pessimistic outlook. Future research along these lines could
lead to a better understanding of when and why people adopt and communicate
particular expectations about important goals as well as the impact of these expectations on whether or not they succeed at these goals.

94	HAZLETT ET AL.

APPENDIX A. Statements used in the outlook
Manipulation in Study 3
Optimistic
I will perform better than I expect on this task.
Most people will perform worse than me on this task.
This task will not be challenging for me.
I am confident that I can accomplish this task well.
I have a good feeling about my performance on this task.
Pessimistic
I will perform worse than I expect on this task.
Most people will perform better than me on this task.
This task will be challenging for me.
I am not confident that I can accomplish this task well.
I have a bad feeling about my performance on this task.
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